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Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of initial committee seniority on the career histories of Democratic
members of the House of Representatives from 1949 to 2006. When more than one freshman
representative is assigned to a committee, positions in the seniority queue are established by lottery.
Randomization ensures that queue positions are uncorrelated in expectation with other legislator
characteristics within these groups. This natural experiment allows us to estimate the causal effect
of seniority on a variety of career outcomes. Lower ranked committee members are less likely to
serve as subcommittee chairs on their initial committee, are more likely to transfer to other
committees, and have fewer sponsored bills passed in the jurisdiction of their initial committee. On
the other hand, there is little evidence that the seniority randomization has a net effect on reelection
outcomes or non-committee bills passed.
In this paper we examine the effects of the committee seniority system in the U.S. House of
Representatives on the career histories of individual legislators. The committee assignment
process used by the Democratic Caucus in the House of Representatives provides us with a
rare opportunity to sort out the consequences of seniority for the behavior of individuals while
avoiding confounding effects due to chronological age, experience or other characteristics.
When members are first assigned to committees, seniority ranks are determined by lot within
groups of representatives that have equivalent chamber seniority. The randomization process
ensures that, in expectation, seniority is uncorrelated with pre-treatment characteristics of
committee members. This natural experiment allows us to estimate the causal impact of
differences in seniority on a variety of career history outcomes.
Seniority and Legislative Careers
The seniority system in the U.S. House of Representatives is a collection of formal and informal
rules and norms according to which long-serving members possess more procedural privileges
and control more resources than do their junior colleagues. Two key practices constitute the
foundation of the seniority system for House committees (Goodwin, 1959; Polsby, Gallagher
and Rundquist, 1969). First, once a member is appointed to a committee, that member is
transferred to another committee only with his or her consent.1 Second, the majority-party
*Thanks to Adam Glynn, Dan Hopkins, Kevin Quinn, Ian Yohai, Nolan McCarty, Keith Krehbiel, and two anonymous referees for
comments on previous versions of this paper. Shepsle acknowledges support from the National Institute of Aging (ROI AG 021181).
1Exceptions arise when a change in the composition of the chamber requires one of the parties to reduce the number of its partisans on
a committee (which rarely occurs because party leaders typically negotiate a larger committee size to accommodate compositional changes
in the full House) or when a committee is abolished.
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tmember with the longest service on a committee is presumed to have the first claim on the
chair of that committee. These and other seniority-based practices are operationalized in the
House by assigning ranks to each member of the party caucus on a particular committee at the
time of initial assignment to the committee. Members move up the committee queue as more
senior members leave the committee due to transfer, electoral defeat, retirement, or death. Thus,
seniority is committee-specific; the seniority system consists of a set of parallel queues in which
members advance at different speeds.
Most existing empirical studies of the congressional seniority system use seniority as an
indicator of the relative power of party leaders and rank-and-file legislators within the
institution (Polsby, 1968; Crook and Hibbing, 1985; Cox and McCubbins, 1991), or examine
the representativeness of committee leadership cadres produced by the seniority system
(Hinckley, 1969). Fewer studies consider the effects of the seniority system from the
perspective of individual legislators embedded within it.
For legislators, positions on congressional committees represent assets that they can use to
advance their electoral and policy objectives. All else equal, holding a higher position in a
seniority queue is at least as valuable as a lower position. If seniority norms are followed, all
members expect a higher-ranked member to become chair before a lower-ranked member.
Likewise, since the Subcommittee Bill of Rights, the higher-ranked member will be advantaged
in bidding for subcommittee chairs. The discounted present value of a given queue position
depends in part on the political fortunes of the legislator, the fortunes of those above her in the
queue, the status of her party in the legislative chamber, and the possibility that the seniority
system itself will change in a manner that affects the value of her queue position. She takes the
expected value of her committee ranks into account when making decisions about her political
career: whether to transfer to another committee, to seek higher office, or to ride off into the
sunset (possibly with a detour to K Street).
Given a disadvantageous queue position, legislators have a number of potential responses. One
possibility is to transfer to a different committee.2 If the value of a committee assignment
depends on a member’s place in the seniority queue, then members holding lower queue
positions are more likely to transfer. It is not clear a priori when during a legislator’s career
we would expect to see strong seniority effects on the probability of transfer. On the one hand,
representatives who “lose the lottery” (i.e., who are randomized into inferior queue positions
within their committee cohort) might respond quickly to their ex post position in a committee
queue in order to start accumulating seniority on a different committee. On the other hand,
almost every legislator involved in a randomization is located far down the seniority queue;
most are freshmen. In that position, members face considerable uncertainty about the career
prospects of those ahead of them in the queue. They might wait before transferring in the hope
that this uncertainty will resolve in their favor.
Member career calculations could, as a second possibility, induce them to respond to a
disadvantageous queue position by leaving Congress. As a general matter, low queue positions
should not affect the electoral prospects of an incumbent legislator. After all, voters cannot
reverse the effects of the randomization by defeating an incumbent. Electing a challenger
implies that the district’s next representative will rank lower on the same committee or will be
on a different committee altogether. Indeed, one of the main effects of a legislative seniority
system is to advantage all incumbents relative to their challengers (McKelvey and Riezman,
1992; Holcombe, 1989). Any effect of differences in seniority should therefore operate through
2Shepsle (1978) presents data on the congresses from 1958–74 showing that half of all freshmen seek transfers or the acquisition of
additional assignments in their first non-freshman term. By the time members are in their fifth term or higher, 95% have sought to alter
their freshman portfolio in some manner, some multiple times.
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tthe career decisions of legislators rather than the electoral judgments of constituents. To the
extent that losing the seniority lottery makes a committee assignment marginally less valuable,
losers may find other outside opportunities, such as statewide office, relatively more attractive.
3
The assignment process
Our research strategy takes advantage of the process by which the Democratic Caucus assigns
seniority ranks to newly appointed committee members. For our purposes, it is useful to divide
the assignment process into two parts: committee assignment and seniority assignment. The
process of assigning new and returning representatives to committees involves strategic
behavior on the part of both members and the Democratic party body responsible for committee
assignments (Shepsle, 1978; Frisch and Kelly, 2006). As a result, the process of committee
assignment is non-random; it depends on a variety of observable and non-observable
characteristics of individual legislators.
The Democratic Committee on Committees4 determines seniority ranks only after it assigns
members to committees.5 Members returning to the committee retain their position in the
queue, moving up to a higher rank if members above them do not return to the committee.
Below the returning members are, in priority sequence, newly appointed members who used
to serve on the same committee, followed by non-freshmen representatives who transfer on to
the committee for the first time during their current tenure in the House, then freshmen
representatives who served in the House (but not the committee) in some earlier period, and
finally any freshmen with no prior service in the House.
After these priority rules are applied, ties often remain between representatives within these
categories (especially the last). The Democratic Committee on Committees breaks these ties
through a randomization process, literally drawing names out of a box.6 We call these groups
of representatives with equivalent records randomization groups. Representatives retain the
ordering established by this randomization throughout their service on the committee.
The randomization procedure used to break ties is key to our empirical strategy. Each time the
Democratic Committee on Committees randomizes the rankings within a group of
representatives, it in effect conducts a natural experiment. This ensures that in expectation any
pre-existing attributes of representatives that could influence later career trajectories – their
political experience or skill, the competitiveness of their districts, the influence of their state
delegation within the caucus – are uncorrelated with the rank that they receive within the
randomization group. Existing studies have not exploited this aspect of the assignment process,
which allows for more reliable causal inferences about the effects (or absence thereof) of the
seniority system on member careers.
3In contrast, representatives who are fairly close to the top of a seniority queue may be tempted to remain until those assigned to places
higher in the queue have left the scene. Hall and van Houweling (1995) find some suggestive evidence: representatives who were second
in their full committee queues in 1994 were more likely to run for reelection than other members, particularly when they were younger
than the committee chair (after controlling for the main effect of age).
4Prior to 1975, this was the Democratic membership of the House Ways and Means Committee; after that point, this role was assumed
by the Steering Committee of the Democratic Caucus.
5Some vacancies may remain unfilled. Others are filled provisionally (called waiver appointments); these are filled only for the congress
in question by granting a member a waiver to serve even if in nominal violation of Caucus rules governing committee service.
6One of the authors interviewed a senior advisor to Speaker Pelosi who stated that he personally organized the randomizations by writing
the names of newly assigned members on slips of paper, placing them in a box, and having a member of the Committee on Committees
draw slips from the box to establish the ordering. E-mail correspondence with an advisor to Speaker Foley and Minority Leader Gephardt
confirmed that similar procedures were used during their time in office.
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tData and Models
Our research strategy requires us to identify groups of two or more Democratic representatives
with equal seniority assigned to a single committee at the same time. We use data on committee
assignments from the 80th to 108th Congress.7 We identify groups of legislators who (1)
received new assignments to a committee on the same date, (2) had equivalent chamber
seniority, and (3) were assigned consecutive seniority ranks on their new committees. In the
interest of making the observations used to estimate the effects of seniority on congressional
careers more homogenous, we exclude assignments to select committees or standing
committees subject to term limitations. We also remove randomization groups from the three
exclusive committees (Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means) as well as those groups
composed of non-freshmen.8 This leaves freshmen randomization groups from the major and
minor legislative committees.
After imposing these restrictions, we have 1348 observations in 308 freshman randomization
groups, summarized in Table 1. Each committee assignment that falls in a randomization group
constitutes an observation; members randomized on two or more committees appear in the
dataset more than once. Both the number of congresses in which randomization takes place
and the total number of freshmen assigned varies dramatically across committees. In the data,
there are no committees for which freshman randomization took place in all 29 congresses;
Banking, Interior, and Science came closest with 24 each (see second row of Table 1). In nearly
all cases, freshmen committee members received ranks far from the top of the committee queue;
more than 97% ranked tenth or lower at the time of their initial assignment.
Each randomization group constitutes a small experiment on the effects of differences in
seniority on career outcomes. The process that generates those outcomes is quite noisy, so we
aggregate across these experiments and model the outcomes as a function of the queue position
assigned by lot. Randomization groups differ in size (ranging from 2 to 15 members) and in
the number of returning members occupying positions above them in the queue. To address
this heterogeneity, we rescale the assigned seniority ranks within each randomization group
by subtracting the median rank in the group.9 This ensures that both the median and mean
rescaled rank within each randomization group is zero. Some normalization is necessary
because the nominal ranks assigned to the freshmen in a randomization group are correlated
with contextual factors that could introduce bias.10
To check the effectiveness of the randomization in achieving balance, we estimated a model
with rescaled ranks as the outcome and pre-assignment covariates as predictors. As expected,
these covariates (including age, margin of victory, delegation size, and prior political
experience) do not predict rescaled ranks individually or as a group.11
To estimate the effect of differences in seniority, we use generalized linear models appropriate
to the nature of the outcome of interest.12 Randomization balances the pre-assignment
characteristics in expectation, so we do not control for these characteristics in the results
7This data comes from the committee assignment datasets collected by Garrison Nelson, Charles Stewart, and their collaborators.
8Deletion of these observations removes less than 20% of the data and makes the remaining observations substantially more homogenous.
Moreover, including them in the analysis does not affect the substantive conclusions presented in this article (details are available in the
online appendix). We hesitate to extend our inferences to the exclusive committees or to non-freshmen randomization groups because
these groups contribute so little information to the overall estimates.
9For example, if a three-member randomization group was assigned ranks 19, 20, and 21 on a particular committee, we rescale their
ranks to −1, 0, and 1. Negative ranks correspond to more senior queue positions.
10For example, the number of Democrats on each committee increases in tandem with the number of Democrats in the House as a whole.
As a result, freshmen members joining the committee receive lower nominal ranks in congresses with large Democratic caucuses.
11Details are available in the online appendix.
12All of the analyses presented in this paper were conducted using the R statistical computing environment. Replication code and data
are available from the authors on request.
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treported here.13 We do, however, assume linearity and additivity on the scale appropriate to
each model when aggregating across randomization groups. While we would not necessarily
expect the effect of seniority to be linear throughout the whole range of possible ranks, we
believe that linearity is a reasonable assumption for the subset of ranks that freshmen actually
receive.14 Although linearity, additivity, and other modeling assumptions impose a fair amount
of structure on the problem, the balance implied by randomization means that our estimates
depend less on our modeling choices than they would in traditional observational settings (Ho
et al., 2007).
It is important to note that our inferences are conditional on the members actually assigned to
each committee. Members receive committee assignments on the basis of a variety of
characteristics. As a result, one cannot assume that the observed effects of seniority would be
the same if the Committee on Committees randomly assigned members to committees.
This counterfactual is not particularly interesting, however, because the Democratic Caucus
doubtless will never choose to make committee assignments without taking political
considerations such as the expressed preferences of members into account. To the extent that
the committee assignment process is essentially stationary over time (that is, the characteristics
of freshman legislators assigned to particular committees remain consistent across congresses),
we can use the available data to make inferences about the effects of seniority on the careers
of those representatives who are assigned to particular committees.
Findings
Seniority and subcommittee chairs
We first estimate the effect of differences in initial seniority on the probability that a newly
assigned committee member serves as a subcommittee chair on that committee at some point
in the legislator’s career.15 This outcome is closely linked to the seniority system; before the
reforms of the 1970s, senior members of the full committee held most subcommittee chairs,
while the bidding system for subcommittee chairs implemented after the reforms gives senior
committee members the first opportunity to fill open positions. We estimate the model using
randomization groups from the 80th–105th Congress, instead of the full sample extending to
the 108th Congress, in order to have a dozen years of career history for those members still
serving in Congress.16
As expected, members randomized into more senior ranks on their committees are more likely
to serve as subcommittee chairs on those committees. To characterize the magnitude of this
effect, we calculate the expected probability (using simple logistic regression) of serving as a
subcommittee chair for the most and least senior member of a five-member randomization
group (in other words, members separated by four ranks). Based on the estimates generated by
the model, the most senior member of the randomization group becomes a subcommittee chair
with probability 0.324, while the least senior member becomes a subcommittee chair with
probability of only 0.209; this difference of 0.115 is the seniority effect within a five-member
randomization group. The first row of Figure 1 illustrates this effect along with a simulation-
based 95% confidence interval for the difference in probability.17 An effect of this magnitude
13Including covariates can increase the precision with which the effects are estimated. We re-estimated the models reported here using
a number of pre-assignment characteristics. The estimates produced by these models were neither substantively different nor more precise
than the results reported here; they are available in the online appendix.
14In other words, although we expect that the difference between ranking first and second is larger than the difference between second
and third, it is unlikely that the effect of being ranked 14th vs. 15th is much different from 15th vs. 16th.
15We identified members who served as subcommittee chairs using various editions of the Congressional Directory.
16In 9 cases out of 1268, members retain their initial committee assignments but have not yet served as subcommittee chairs. We treat
these as zeros for this analysis, but our results are not sensitive to other assumptions.
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timplies that differences in initial seniority play an important role in determining which
members in a randomization group attain leadership positions on the committee.
The estimated seniority effect on the probability of becoming a subcommittee chair captures
both the (direct) mechanics of the seniority system and the (indirect) behavioral responses of
those embedded within it. The time that members must serve on a committee before gaining a
subcommittee chair allows for two indirect channels through which the randomization may
affect the probability of becoming a subcommittee chair. Members faced with poor queue
positions may transfer more frequently to other committees than those who do well in the
lottery. They may also be less likely to remain in the House. Having confirmed that the total
effect is substantively and statistically significant, we now examine these indirect mechanisms
in more detail.
Seniority and transfers
We estimate the effect of seniority on the probability that members leave the committee to
which they have been assigned, either to transfer to a different committee or to reduce their
total number of committee assignments. We explore the probability and timing of transfers by
defining both short- and long-term transfer outcomes. The first outcome measures transfers
occurring through the organization of committees in the sophomore terms of Democratic
representatives who were initially randomized to seniority ranks. Members who transfer during
their first term or who do not return to their committees at the start of the second term are coded
as 1, while all others are coded as 0. A second outcome of interest is whether legislators
transferred off of their initial committee at any point during their congressional service. Again,
this variable is coded 1 if a member left his or her committee of first assignment while remaining
in the House. Members who remain on the committee until they leave the House due to death,
defeat, or retirement are coded as zeros.18 With this coding convention, career transfers are a
superset of first-term transfers.
We do not find strong evidence of a seniority effect on transfer behavior in the short term. As
shown in the second row of Figure 1, plausible estimates of the seniority effect in a five-member
group (as measured by a 95% confidence interval) range from a 0.03 increase in the probability
of transfer for the most senior member to a 0.05 decrease in probability, relative to the least
senior member of the group.
Turning to transfers over the course of a career (third row of Figure 1), we do find evidence
that members lower in the queue are more likely to transfer off their initial committees.
Returning to our example of a five-member randomization group, the probability that the
lowest-ranked member transfers at some point during his or her career is approximately 0.437,
while the probability for the highest-ranked member is only 0.370. This seniority effect of
−0.067 is substantively smaller than the effect of seniority on the probability of serving as
subcommittee chair (0.115), both because the implied difference in probability is smaller and
because the baseline probability of transfers is higher. To put the magnitude of this effect in
context, this difference (0.067) is comparable to the difference in the probability of transfer
between members assigned to their first-choice committee and those assigned to committees
that were not their first choice.19
17These estimates were generated using the Zelig package for R, which uses simulation to calculate point estimates and confidence
intervals for quantities of interest that are not model parameters.
18As with subcommittee chairs, we restrict the analysis of career transfer outcomes to randomization groups in the 80th–105th
Congresses. In 67 cases, members remained on their initial committees at the end of the 110th Congress. Transfers after the sixth term
are quite rare, so we treat these cases as non-transfers.
19Strictly speaking, the estimated difference in transfer probability associated with assignment to a legislator’s first-choice committee
does not estimate a causal effect, because the Committee on Committees does not randomly assign members to receive their first-choice
committees. Frisch and Kelly (2007) provides data on committee requests; details of the calculation are provided in the online appendix.
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tThese results demonstrate that seniority influences the transfer behavior of Democratic
members of Congress over the course of their careers. The absence of a statistically significant
effect on transfers during the first year could arise in one of two ways. The transfer process
may be too noisy to recover an effect after only one term. On the other hand, seniority may
influence transfer behavior more strongly after legislators know more about their prospects on
their current committees. We obtain suggestive evidence by examining the cumulative
proportion of members who have transferred after a given period. To make such an analysis
tractable, we divide the dataset based on whether the member was in the upper or lower half
of his or her randomization group.20 As seen in Figure 2, the cumulative proportions of
members who have transferred are essentially identical in the two groups through the
organization of committees in the second term. This is consistent with our estimates for the
effect of seniority on short-run transfer behavior. In the remainder of second and third terms,
however, the proportion of members who have transferred in the less senior group increases
much faster than the proportion in the more senior group. From the fourth term on, transfers
become exceedingly rare and the curves are essentially parallel. This implies that the strongest
effects of seniority on transfer behavior occur during the second and third terms, after some of
the uncertainty about the prospects of higher-ranked members has been resolved.
Seniority and reelection
Having shown that the results of seniority lotteries affect the career paths of Democratic
legislators within the House, we now estimate the effects of differences in seniority on the
probability that members remain in the House. We first consider whether the randomization
affects the probability that a member is elected to a second term in Congress. Representatives
who serve a second term are coded as 1, while those who do not seek reelection or who are
defeated at the polls are coded as 0. Figure 1 (fourth row) shows that there is little difference
in the estimated probability of reelection to a second term; in a five-member group, the
estimated difference between the most senior and least senior member is approximately −0.01
with a 95% confidence interval of (−0.05, 0.03). We also look at longer-term reelection
outcomes (Figure 1, fifth row). In our dataset, the median length of continuous service is five
terms. Using data from members elected to the 80th–105th Congresses, we estimate the effects
of differences in initial seniority on the probability that a member’s tenure exceeds the median.
Again, the estimated effects are small – approximately −0.01 for our five-member
randomization group – and statistically insignificant.
The large amount of data and the confidence that comes from randomization across pre-
treatment characteristics enables us to demonstrate that seniority has essentially no effect on
members’ reelection prospects. These results are consistent with theoretical views of seniority
as a protection system for the generic incumbent and thus independent of the outcome of the
seniority lottery. The results also suggest that differences in seniority do not affect member
decisions to remain in the House.
Seniority and legislative production
Finally, we turn to the legislative production of Democratic members of Congress assigned to
committees in randomization groups. Legislative output has many dimensions, all of which
are difficult to quantify. We use a rough measure: the number of bills sponsored by a member
of Congress that are approved by the House of Representatives during the legislator’s career.
This data is available for the 80th–106th Congresses from the Congressional Bills Project
compiled by Adler and Wilkerson (2007).
20Dividing the data in this way ensures that each randomization group contributes equally to the two subsets, so that differences in
transfer behavior are not due to the determinants of the size of the randomization group. This analysis excludes the 134 members ranked
in the middle of randomization groups with odd numbers of freshmen.
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tModeling bill production requires a more complicated statistical approach. Bill counts have
extra-Poisson variability, and the total number of bills is not observed for members who
remained in office beyond the 106th Congress.21 As a result, we use a censored negative
binomial regression model (Caudill and Mixon, 1995) that accounts for these characteristics
of the data. As before, we estimate the model using randomization groups from the 80th–105th
Congresses, so that the data contains at least two terms of bill production for all censored
observations. Based on the model, the average number of sponsored bills passed by the House
is approximately 11.1 over the course of a member’s career. In a five-member randomization
group, the most senior member expects have 11.6 bills passed by the House, while the least
senior member expects to have 10.7 bills passed. As shown in Figure 3, this expected difference
of approximately .9 bills is not statistically significant at the .05 level.
To explore this difference further, we divide bills into those referred to the member’s initially
assigned committee and those referred to other committees. Approximately 80% of bills
reported by committees are sponsored by a committee member and such bills are much more
likely to be approved by the whole House, which increases the likelihood of a seniority effect
in this subset of bills. Again using the censored negative binomial model, we find an effect in
committee-referred bills, but not in bills referred to other committees. The most senior member
of a five-member group expects to have five bills referred to his or her initial committee and
passed by the House, while the least senior member only expects to pass 3.6 bills through his
or her initial committee. This difference is statistically distinguishable from zero at the .05
level, but is not estimated precisely, with plausible effect sizes ranging from zero to three
additional bills. The estimated difference in the number of committee-referred bills passed by
the House is larger than the difference in the total number passed by the House. This is reflected
in the estimated negative (but non-significant) effect on non-committee-referred bills. These
results suggest that lower productivity in bills referred to other committees may partially offset
the increased productivity of more senior members on their initial committees, but this
conclusion is tentative given the noise in the data.
Several factors contribute to greater legislative production by more senior committee members.
The results discussed above demonstrate that more senior members are more likely to become
subcommittee chairs and thus have legislative responsibilities that accompany those positions.
Moreover, more senior members are less likely to change committees and shift their interests
to other legislative areas. This result does not appear to be due to differences in time served,
because initial differences in seniority do not affect total time in the House.
Conclusion
The natural experiment created by the practice of randomly assigning committee seniority
within groups of freshmen representatives provides a unique opportunity to understand how
the committee seniority system affects the careers of Democratic members of Congress. We
have focused on Democratic freshman assignments to major and minor legislative committees,
which provide the vast majority of cases where randomization took place, while showing (in
the appendix) that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of randomization groups from
exclusive committees or consisting of non-freshmen. First, as we expect from the simple
mechanics of the seniority system, freshmen who receive positions closer to the top of the
queue are more likely to chair subcommittees on the committees to which they were initially
assigned. Second, representatives randomized to more junior queue positions are more likely
21Note that we do not attempt to control for the length of time that members serve in the House because this is determined after the
assignment of seniority ranks. While the results of the previous section suggest that differences in seniority do not affect tenure in office,
controlling for the length of time that members have to introduce bills after initial seniority ranks are determined makes a causal
interpretation more difficult.
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tto transfer to a different committee. This appears to be a rational response to a lower present-
value assessment of their committee position; they have less to lose by moving to a new
committee. The effect of seniority differences on transfers appears to be the strongest in the
second and third terms, when members have a better sense of their future prospects in their
initial queue. Finally, we find that random assignment to a more senior position on a committee
increases the productivity of a legislator on topics under that committee’s jurisdiction, as
measured by the number of sponsored bills passed by the House. These results suggest that
winning the seniority lottery provides incentives for members of Congress to focus their
legislative activities on their initial committee assignments. On the other hand, differences in
the seniority ranks assigned to freshmen do not appear to affect the length of time that members
serve in the House, nor do these differences significantly affect their legislative success in areas
outside of their initial committee jurisdictions.
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tFigure 1. Estimated effects of four-rank difference in initial seniority on probability of attaining
career outcomes
Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for change in the expected probability of
indicated event due to change from the least senior to the most senior member of a five-person
randomization group. Estimates based on logistic regression results (available in the online
appendix) and generated by simulation from the sampling distribution of the model parameters.
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tFigure 2. Cumulative proportion of members transferring from initial committee assignment
Members in the more senior group (black) rank in the top half of their randomization groups,
while members in the less senior group (gray) rank in the lower half.
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tFigure 3. Estimated effects of four-rank difference in initial seniority on legislative production
Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for change in the expected number of bills passed
due to change from the least senior to the most senior member of a five-person randomization
group. Estimates based on censored negative binomial regression results (available in the
online appendix) and generated by simulation from the sampling distribution of the model
parameters. N=1248.
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